报告题目：A Deduction Mechanism for Public Goods Provision （公共品提供问题中的扣除机制）

报告人：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（山东大学）

报告时间：2024年7月5日（星期五）上午9:30-11:30

报告地点：英国正版365官方网站大楼318

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山大特聘教授。美国卫尔斯利女子学院学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士。担任North American Journal of Economics and Finance等多份国际学术期刊客座编辑与编委成员，担任大陆、香港、台湾、新加坡等政府科研资助机构评审专家，担任多所高校教师晋升外审专家，担任31种期刊匿名评审人，多次获评杰出评审人。研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。曾获"中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖"、"中国信息经济学2018青年创新奖"和"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"。

报告摘要：

We propose a simple commitment mechanism prior to a public goods contribution game. Each player simultaneously and independently proposes a deduction rate, which serves as a proposal for the rate by which the return on private investment accounts will be reduced. The group deduction rate is determined by the minimum level of the individually proposed rates. In the two-stage game with linear payoffs, the first-best outcome is achieved in the refined equilibrium, with a sufficiently high group deduction rate being chosen. The mechanism also improves efficiency for non-linear games. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate whether and how our counter-intuitive mechanism works. The experimental findings highlight the importance of learning opportunities via examples. Even with repeated play, many subjects persist in choosing low deduction rates and therefore, welfare remains low. However, with exogenously given examples of group deduction rates, subjects learn quickly and achieve efficient outcomes when they later determine the deduction rates endogenously.